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THE IMPORTANT CONTINGENCIES IN GAMBLING ARE SELDOM 
CLEAR: AVOIDING THE RATIONAL CHOICE TRAP 
 




 Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino ask how 
clear the contingencies are in a standard gam-
bling situation, and suggest that when contin-
gencies are made clear, both people and pig-
eons will choose in a “rational” manner ap-
propriate to the constraints imposed by the 
prevailing contingencies. But, then they note 
that human decision making is not terribly 
rational or logical. Gambling regulations spe-
cify that parameters such as payout amount 
and odds of winning be clearly communicated 
to gamblers; gambling guidebooks, tip sheets 
and websites are readily available. Yet, gam-
bling abounds, and problem gambling affects 
2.3% of the USA adult population. Nearly 
four out of five US adults report having gam-
bled. Of those, 12.2% of frequent gamblers 
become problem gamblers while 4.3% be-
come pathological gamblers. Pathological 
gamblers report annual losses up to $5,000 
(Kessler et al., 2008). Clearly, many people 
are not choosing rationally. Fantino and Sto-
larz-Fantino suggest that answers may be 
found in the gambler‟s head or in the gamb-
ler‟s social milieu. Or, in other words, we 
could be rational, we may indeed want to be 
rational, but the buzzing in our heads and 
buzzing by our fellow creatures around us are 
holding us back. And with that we step right 
into the jaws of the rational choice trap. 
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 Rational choice theory has dominated 
economics and discourse about decision mak-
ing for decades. Herrnstein (1990) points out, 
rational choice theory may be an excellent 
prescriptive theory (how we should behave), 
but fails as a descriptive theory (how we ac-
tually behave). We argue that it also fails as a 
prescriptive theory, largely because rational 
choice theory ignores our evolved, naturally 
selected decision processes, and privileges a 
cognitive calculus as the central decision me-
chanism. Rational choice theory may be a bet-
ter prescription for industrial automatons than 
for evolved biological organisms. As long as 
it is assumed that humans should or do want 
to be “rational” in this classical manner, our 
attempts to understand and ameliorate prob-
lem gambling will remain trapped. 
 Consider first the problem of probability. 
Although probabilities involved in games of 
chance are easily accessed, stated probabili-
ties do not seem to exert much control over 
our behavior. It could be the buzzing in our 
heads that interferes with calculations. Or, it 
could be that the rational representation of 
probabilities in terms of odds is not how our 
species has come to understand probability. 
Cosmides and Tooby (1996) have shown that 
when decision problems are expressed in 
terms of probabilities, we choose “irrational-
ly.” But when the same problems are ex-
pressed as frequencies (occurrences over 
time) we seem to get it right most of the time. 
Why should a seemingly simple verbal ad-
justment make such a difference? Homo sa-
piens evolved learning about probabilities by 
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sitting on a rock, watching prey gambol down 
different sides of a valley, noting the number 
that went in each direction, and choosing 
where to hunt based on these observations. 
We didn‟t perform the calculus of probabili-
ties with sticks in the sand. Taking this analy-
sis a step further, it may be that we are much 
more sensitive to amount, and count, than we 
are to probability; but ironically the contin-
gencies of gambling are expressed in terms of 
probability! Lyons and Ghezzi (1995) provide 
some excellent field evidence here, showing 
that wagers in state lotteries are largely insen-
sitive to changes in probability but are very 
sensitive to changes in amount of payout. The 
contingencies may be clear to a calculator, but 
not to most humans. 
 Consider second the problem of delay. 
All real gambles are delays; the one-shot 
stated probability type problems that seem 
ubiquitous in the literature are minimally in-
formative at best. No real person gambles 
once, and never before or never hereafter, 
based on stated probabilities, except in a 
modern cognitive psychology laboratory. 
Gambling is either used in the progressive 
tense (indicates ongoing action) or perfect 
progressive tense (indicates action that started 
in the past, continues in the present, and will 
be completed at some time in the future), im-
plying repeated plays over time. Once time 
enters the analysis, delay is only seconds be-
hind. It is a good bet that delay discounting 
may have much more to do with gambling 
than we suspect.  For example, consider the  
„near miss‟ effect in video poker (in which 
cards close to those needed for a win appear 
in the display). These cards appear on nearly 
every play, much more immediately than any 
wins, and are implicated in the especially en-
trapping nature of this game (Parke & Grif-
fiths, 2004).  Does the „near miss„ serve as a 
sufficient fairly immediate conditioned rein-
forcer to maintain high levels of play despite 
heavy losses? As another example, the „illu-
sion of control‟ and other „irrational‟ thinking 
found in gambling (e.g., self statements about 
winning) may also serve as fairly immediate 
conditioned reinforcers that maintain play. 
Humans are not very sensitive to the passage 
of time without the aid of external stimuli 
(DiClemente & Hantula, 2003); thus it is not 
surprising that the modern casino is bereft of 
clocks, and windowless; like a trap. 
 We wager that answers to the puzzles 
posed by problem gambling lie somewhere at 
the intersection of amount, probability, delay, 
and personal reinforcement history, not 
trapped inside gamblers‟ heads. Indeed, it is 
only when we stop viewing problem gam-
bling as a costly violation of self-interest and 
start viewing it as the product of a complex 
interplay of naturally selected adaptations will 
we successfully avoid the enticing jaws of the 
rational choice trap. 
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